

Attitudes as stable and transparent constructions

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Abstract

In three studies we examined the assumption that attitudes can be based on a stable structure of individually important attributes. In the first study we examined if people are able to adequately determine what the attributes are that underlie their attitude by relating meta-attitudinal measures to more operative measures of attribute importance. The results of the operative measures corroborate the subjective ratings of importance. In the second study we examined the associative strength between the individually important attributes and the attitude object. Results indicate that priming participants with individually important attributes leads to facilitation of the overall attitudinal response, as opposed to priming them with less important attributes. This suggests a bottom-up process underlying attitude judgment. The third study shows that attitude strength can play a moderating role in this respect. Implications for research on attitude structure are discussed.

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When we are asked why we opt for a particular behavior, we rarely experience difficulty coming up with plausible reasons. We bought the muffin because we felt hungry and we opted for the expensive Swedish car because it is safer and we consider safety an important aspect of a car. Generally, we seem to experience no difficulty at all to generate reasons and for a long time psychologists have relied on this ability to engage in introspection.

Nisbett and Wilson (1977) argued that meta-attitudinal measures, based on people's insight into their own cognitions, are inherently unreliable because they are subject to various distortions. They suggest that when people attempt to report on their cognitive processes, they base their reports on implicit causal theories. This reasoning is in accordance with Fishbein and Ajzen (1975), who also have little faith in our introspective qualities. They argue that people lack the capability to assess the relative importance of the behavioral beliefs associated with their attitude. It has been argued that more operative measures of attitude are superior to these meta-attitudinal measures, because they are not

mediated by subjective perceptions (Bassili, 1996; Bassili, 1993; Bassili & Fletcher, 1991).

This decreased faith in the validity of introspection about cognitive processes goes against the notion that attitudes are (knowingly) based on a stable underlying structure of beliefs. So even though there is still a considerable amount of research which assumes that attitudes *are* based on more specific attributes or beliefs, in this research it is often argued that *which* beliefs are combined into an overall attitudinal judgment is a matter of *context*. In other words, researchers who *do* assume that attitudes can be based on more specific attributes usually do not have much faith in the stability of these underlying cognitions. For example, Tourangeau and Rasinski (1988) acknowledged that answering questions about an attitude object may be based on existing knowledge structures, but stressed that attribute importance and accessibility are not necessarily related. Tourangeau assumes that the process of attitudinal judgment involves steps as identifying the relevant attitude, retrieving some or all of its contents from memory, and integrating what is retrieved into an overall judgment (Tourangeau, 1984, 1987; Tourangeau & Rasinski, 1988; Tourangeau, Rasinski, & D'Andrade, 1991), but

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argued that information retrieval from memory is often unreliable and subject to various distortions.

More specifically they investigated context effects such as recency of use, and topical distance between the target and prime (see, e.g., Tourangeau et al., 1991). The work of Tourangeau and his colleagues therefore can be related to other work in which it has been argued that attitudes are based on information that happens to be accessible at that specific moment (Bem, 1972; Roskos-Ewoldsen & Fazio, 1997; Strack & Martin, 1987; Tourangeau, 1984, 1987; Tourangeau & Rasinski, 1988; Tourangeau et al., 1991; Wilson & Hodges, 1992; Zeller & Feldman, 1992).

Others have gone even further and argued that when people engage in thinking about the reasons underlying their attitude, the distortions resulting from this introspection can even *change* the overall attitude. The work of Wilson and colleagues on introspection (e.g. Wilson, Dunn, Kraft, & Lisle, 1989; Wilson, Hodges, & LaFleur, 1995) suggests that if people are explicitly asked for the reasons that underlie their attitude, this induces a process of *cognitization*, where a set of attributes of the attitude object becomes available that ordinarily has no influence on attitude relevant behavior. This set of attributes can then be incorporated in the overall judgment and thus influence the overall attitude.

Typically, the majority of studies on these context effects and automaticity focused on rather trivial attitudes such as soft drinks (Wilson & Dunn, 1986), strawberries, and cake (Bargh, Chaiken, Govender, & Pratto, 1992) or posters (Wilson, Lisle, Schooler, & Hodges, 1993). We expect that when it comes to non-trivial issues and decisions people are more likely to engage in careful cognitive elaboration. We proposed that people base their attitudes on a limited number of considerations, and are aware of the aspects that are the prime determinants of their attitude (Van der Pligt & De Vries, 1998; Van der Pligt, De Vries, Manstead, & Van Harreveld, 2000).

The aim of the present research is to gain more insight into the question whether there is a stable network based on a limited set of more specific beliefs that underlies the attitude. According to such a propositional network, the attitude object and the more specific beliefs are assumed to be nodes in an associative network and the more these nodes are activated simultaneously, the stronger the links between these nodes should become (e.g., Higgins, 1989). In other words, if someone often thinks about the detrimental consequences of eating chocolate, the associative strength between the nodes “chocolate” and “bad for your teeth” should increase.

Van Harreveld, Van der Pligt, De Vries, and Andreas (2000) argued that existing attitudes tend to be based on a limited set of attributes or beliefs, which are chronically associated with the attitude object. They showed that the attributes people select as important are not

only adequate in predicting their overall attitudinal judgment and behavior, they are also more accessible and more easily retrieved from memory. Their results also indicated that this increased accessibility is relatively *stable* over time. In the present series of studies we aim to extend these findings and show that the attitude object and the more specific attributes form a stable associative network in memory. We also examine *when* this is most likely to be the case.

Study 1

In this first study we attempt to replicate and extend the findings of Van Harreveld et al. (2000). Like Van Harreveld et al. (2000) we measure attribute importance and relate it to a number of operative measures. These measures include a lexical decision task in which the accessibility of the various attributes is assessed. Participants were also asked to judge these attributes in terms of their importance and applicability. While Van Harreveld et al. (2000) presented respondents with the Lexical Decision Task (LDT) a week *after* the measures of attribute importance and the other attribute RT measures, in the present study we chose to *start off* with the LDT. This to provide a more conservative test of our assumptions. Since all attributes of smoking are presented in this task, one could argue that all attributes are (temporarily) made more accessible. Hence on the subsequent more judgmental attribute measures, a difference in RTs between important and less important attributes should be more difficult to find. Again we expect a facilitating effect of attribute importance *over and above* the increased accessibility caused by the LDT.

Method

Participants

Seventy-three first-year students of the University of Amsterdam participated in this study in return for either course credit or 7 euros. A total of 21 of these were smokers, while 52 were non-smokers.

Procedure and variables

On arrival participants were seated behind a computer and were guided through the questionnaire by a computer program. First, participants were presented with four semantic differential scales to assess their attitude (Cronbach's $\alpha = .77$). The four items were; *bad-good*, *negative-positive*, *for-against*, and *favorable-unfavorable*. This measure ranged from 1 to 9 and constituted the direct measure of attitude. The order in which the semantic differentials were presented was randomized and response latencies were assessed for each of these responses. In accordance with recommendations

made by Fazio (1990a), participants were asked to respond quickly and accurately.

Subsequently participants were presented with a lexical decision task. In this task participants were presented with 90 words, which sequentially appeared on the screen. After each appearance, participants were required to determine whether or not this was an existing word in the Dutch language and indicate this by pressing a button labeled “yes” or “no.” After a short pause the next word appeared on the screen. The sequence in which these words were presented was randomized.

Of these words 45 were existing in the Dutch language (e.g., “*tafel*”), while the remaining 45 words were non-sensical (e.g., “*krenlob*”). Of the 45 existing words, 15 were directly related to attributes of smoking (e.g., “*lung cancer*”). This set of attributes (listed in Appendices A and B), constituted a modally salient set based on Van der Pligt and De Vries (1998) and Van Harreveld et al. (2000) and included both positive and negative attributes of smoking. With this task we assess whether words related to the selected attributes of smoking are recognized as existing words faster than words related to the non-selected attributes of smoking.

Next, participants were presented with the set of 15 attributes of smoking. Now the perceived likelihood of these attributes was measured on scales ranging from *definitely not* to *definitely*. For all measures we used 9-point scales ranging from 1 to 9. Response times on these measures were recorded. Again the sequence in which the attributes were presented was randomized.

Attribute importance was assessed by means of a selection task (Van der Pligt et al., 2000). Participants were required to select the five attributes they personally considered most important out of the larger set of 15 attributes.

Results

First we computed the mean response latency on the overall attitude measure (assessed with four items), the attribute measures (15 items), the selected attribute measures (5 items), and the non-selected measures (10 items). We logtransformed all response latencies but report untransformed response latencies to provide more insight in the results.

Lexical decision task

With respect to the lexical decision task, we did not only logtransform the reaction times, we also corrected for word length and frequency of the word in the Dutch language. Results on this task show that words that are related to selected, subjectively important attributes of smoking are recognized significantly faster ($M = 593$ ms, $SD = 0.71$) than words that are related to non-selected attributes of smoking ($M = 618$ ms, $SD = 0.49$, $t(67) =$




Fig. 1. Response times for the Lexical Decision Task, Study 1.

3.15, $p < 0.01$). These means represent milliseconds per trial, corrected for length and frequency of use. Results are presented in Fig. 1.

Judgment task

Results show that with respect to the difference in RTs between selected and non-selected attributes our expectations are confirmed. Respondents are faster in judging attributes they selected as important ($M = 2.87$ s, $SD = 1.05$) than attributes they did not select as important ($M = 3.60$ s, $SD = 1.13$). This represents a significant difference ($t(72) = 6.78$, $p < .001$). Results also indicate that the attributes that are selected as important show a higher correlation with the overall attitude ($r = .59$) than the attributes that are not selected as important ($r = .32$), confirming earlier research by Van der Pligt et al. (2000).¹

Discussion

Results of this study show that attributes that people select as important to their overall attitude are judged faster than attributes that are not selected, even after all attributes are made accessible by the LDT. Results of the lexical decision task revealed a similar pattern. Words related to *selected* attributes of smoking are recognized as existing words *faster* than words related to *non-selected* attributes of smoking.

These results replicate the findings of Van Harreveld et al. (2000) by showing that participants are quite able

¹ In accordance with earlier findings by Van Harreveld, Van der Pligt, De Vries, Wenneker and Verhue (in press) we found that participants who select a incongruent set of attributes as important, need more time to come to an overall attitudinal judgment than respondents who select a more congruent set. Because integrating incongruent information is more time consuming than congruent information (Rojahn & Pettigrew, 1992; Vonk & Van Knippenberg, 1995) we think this finding provides support for a bottom-up process of attitudinal judgment where the attitude is constructed by integrating attributes.

in determining which attributes are important to their attitude. The results of the operative measures (RTs) suggest that the relation between that what people *think* is important to their attitude and the attributes that actually *underlie* their attitude is less vulnerable to contextual distortions than suggested by Tourangeau and Rasinski (1988).

The fact that we find effects of importance on attribute RTs over and above the temporarily increased accessibility of all modally salient attributes caused by the LDT, provides some indication that the important attributes are chronically more accessible.

According to Anderson (1983) information is stored in memory as an associative network. In such a network the activation of one piece of information can have implications for other stored information, depending on the link between the various pieces of information. If two pieces of information *are* linked to each other then the activation of one piece of information should lead to the activation of the other. Judd, Drake, Downing and Krosnick (1991) have shown that the activation of one attitude can lead to the facilitation of another attitude if the attitude objects share a structural link in memory. If it is the case that (important) attributes form a knowledge structure in memory and the overall attitudinal judgment is based on the activation of this structure, then activating participants' individually important attributes should lead to faster RTs on the overall attitudinal response. This because we assume that the strength of the network is based on the simultaneous activation of the nodes of which it consists.

If on the other hand it would *not* be the case that a set of important attributes is stored in memory, and chronically associated with the attitude object, there should not be such a facilitating effect. That could mean the overall attitude is activated automatically, without any need to integrate the more specific attributes, such as argued by Bargh et al. (1992). Also if the attitude *is* based on the integration of attributes but *which* attributes are integrated is a matter of context, then one would not find more of a facilitating effect of individually important attributes as compared to individually less important attributes. Therefore in the next study we examine our assumption that important attributes are linked through an associative network and can be activated through a process of spreading activation (Anderson, 1983; Judd et al., 1991). We will test this assumption by examining if priming respondents with *individually important* attributes facilitates the RTs of the overall evaluative judgment. A set of individually unimportant attributes should not facilitate the overall attitudinal response, regardless of whether these attributes are congruent with one's behavior or not. This is what we examine in Study 2.

Study 2

Method

Participants and design

Seventy-nine students participated in this study in return for 7 euros or course credit. Respondents were randomly assigned to one of four experimental conditions: a condition where the attitude RT measure was preceded by a set of selected, important, attributes (1), a condition where the attitude RT measure was preceded by a set of non-selected, less important attributes but *congruent* with one's behavior (2), a condition where the attitude RT measure was preceded by a set of non-selected, less important attributes but *incongruent* with one's behavior (3), and a condition where the attitude RT measure was not preceded by any set of attributes (4). We distinguish between less important attributes that are congruent and those that are incongruent, because previous research has shown that due to a process of spreading activation, the priming of a stereotype leads to the facilitation of consistent traits (Macrae, Stangor, & Milne, 1994). By taking consistency into account we allow ourselves to control for this in the present study.

Procedure and variables

The experiment consisted of two sessions. In both sessions participants were seated behind a computer and were guided through the questionnaire by a computer program. In the first session attribute importance was assessed. Participants were presented with a set of 15 modally salient attributes of smoking. This set was the same as the set used in Study 1. Participants were asked to indicate which five attributes they considered most important to their overall attitude.

One week later respondents returned to the laboratory to participate in the second session of the experiment. In this second session participants were presented with the same four semantic differential scales as in Study 1 in order to assess their attitude (Cronbach's $\alpha = .84$). The order in which the semantic differentials were presented was randomized and response latencies were assessed for each of these responses. For each of the response time measures we asked respondents to indicate their preference as quickly and adequately as possible.

We also measured the RTs to the *attributes*. Dependent on the experimental condition these attributes were either previously selected as important or not selected as important. Respondents in the condition where the attitude RT measure was preceded by a set of unimportant attributes were divided into two groups. One group judging attributes *congruent* with one's behavior and a group judging attributes *incongruent* with one's behavior. We did this by randomly assigning smokers and

non-smokers to conditions where they judged *positive* (but individually less important) attributes of smoking or *negative* (but individually less important) attributes of smoking. Smokers judging positive attributes and non-smokers judging negative attributes thus formed the group judging *congruent* attributes and vice versa. This enables us to exclude any effects of agreeableness of the attributes.

Again the perceived likelihood of these attributes was measured on scales ranging from *definitely not* to *definitely*. For all measures we used 9-point scales ranging from 1 to 9. Response times on these measures were recorded. The sequence in which the attributes were presented was randomized. α for this measure was .81.

Results

We expected that judging individually important attributes would facilitate the speed with which people construct their overall attitude. Results indicated decreased RTs in case of a preceding measure consisting of important attributes. Means are 4.26 s ($SD = 1.19$) for the condition with important attributes, 5.92 s ($SD = 1.45$) for the condition with less important but congruent attributes, 5.43 s ($SD = 1.53$) for the condition with less important and incongruent attributes, and 5.56 s ($SD = 2.22$) for the condition with no attribute measure preceding the attitude measure. When entering all four conditions in a oneway ANOVA, results showed a significant effect ($F(75, 3) = 2.97, p < .05$). More specifically, the LSD post hoc test indicated that the important attribute condition differed from all three other conditions, but none of these three differ from one another. These results are summarized in Fig. 2.

Discussion

Results of Study 2 show that respondents are faster in formulating an overall attitudinal judgment when this judgmental task is preceded by a set of more specific attributes of the attitude object. This, however, only if these attributes are *important* to the individual. A set of individually *less important* attributes has no such facilitating effect on the overall attitude RT. Whether or not




Fig. 2. Attitude RTs by condition, Study 2.

this set of unimportant attributes is in accordance with the attitude or opposing the attitude does not matter. This provides further indication of a stable network of important attributes linked to the overall attitude. The activation of the attribute nodes *does* lead to increased accessibility of the attitude node, but only if these attributes are important to the individual.

We certainly do not want to argue that all attitudes we hold are associated with a stable set of individually important attributes. Under some circumstances it might be more likely that someone uses a more analytic system of thought, whereas under others someone might be inclined to think in a more holistic way (Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001). In the next study we aim to examine a variable that might determine *when* attitudes are likely to be chronically associated with individually important attributes and when not. According to Fazio's MODE model (Fazio, 1990b; Fazio & Towles-Schwen, 1999), attitudes are based on conscious processing if the motivation and the opportunity to do so are available. *Attitude strength* (e.g., Petty & Krosnick, 1995) can be a factor determining whether or not people are motivated to invest time and effort in such conscious processing. Previous research suggests for example that important (and complex) attitudes are associated with a greater need for relevant information and more elaborate processing of information (see Boninger, Krosnick, Berent, & Fabrigar, 1995 for an overview).

In the next study we want to investigate the role of attitude strength. More specifically, we want to examine if the difference in accessibility for important and less important attributes pattern is particularly pronounced for attitude objects that people have stronger feelings about.

Study 3

In the next study we examine attitudes towards to attitude objects and for both objects we compare reaction times for important attributes with less important attributes and test for differences in attitude strength.

Method

Participants

Eighty-three students of the University of Amsterdam participated in this study in return for course credit, 64 of these were female and 19 were male. The age of participants ranged from 18 to 32 with a mean of 21.02 ($SD = 2.57$).

Procedure and variables

On arrival participants were seated behind a computer and were guided through the questionnaire by a

computer program. The experiment concerned to attitudinal issues: smoking and a stricter immigration policy in the Netherlands. First, participants were presented with four semantic differential scales to assess their attitude towards smoking (Cronbach's $\alpha = .85$). The four items were; *bad–good*, *negative–positive*, *for–against*, and *favorable–unfavorable*. On this measure respondents were asked to indicate their attitude by clicking the mouse on a line from 0 to 100. This constituted the direct measure of attitude the alpha of which was .97. The order in which the semantic differentials were presented was randomized.

In the present study we measure attribute RTs employing a dichotomous measure in accordance with Fazio's recommendations.² Participants were presented with the same set of 15 attributes of smoking as in studies 1 and 2. One attribute appeared on the screen and participants were asked to press the *agree* or the *disagree* button. Then after a short pause the second attribute appeared and until the agree or disagree button was pressed and so on. Again they were asked to do so as quickly and adequately as possible.

Attribute importance was assessed by means of a selection task (Van der Pligt et al., 2000). Participants were required to select the five attributes they personally considered most important out of the larger set of 15 attributes.

Next participants were presented with three items measuring attitude strength. These items were: "I consider my attitude toward smoking important," "I am certain about my opinion toward smoking," and "I have put a considerable amount of thought into my attitude toward smoking." These items were measured on 101-point scales ranging from *disagree* (0) to *agree* (100). Cronbach's α for this measure was .65.

Subsequently participants went through the exact same procedure, but now concerning attitudes toward a stricter immigration policy in The Netherlands. At the end of the experiment participants were thanked and debriefed.

Results

Attribute importance

On the basis of the attribute importance selection task and the agree–disagree judgments, we computed two scores for each attitude object; a score based on the mean reaction time to the selected attributes and a score based on the mean reaction time to the non-selected attributes. We logtransformed reaction times and used these scores for testing but here we report the original times for more

insight. For smoking, the mean reaction time on the non-selected attributes was 2.36 s ($SD = .66$). For the selected attributes the mean reaction time was 1.80 s ($SD = .69$), a significant difference ($t(82) = 7.88$, $p < .001$).

For a stricter immigration policy in The Netherlands, the mean reaction time on the non-selected attributes was 6.71 s ($SD = 2.28$) and on the selected attributes 5.58 s ($SD = 2.29$), again a significant difference ($t(82) = 4.03$, $p < .001$). The fact that the mean RTs for this attitude object are higher than for smoking is most likely due to the longer attribute statements.

Attitude strength

We also examined response times for important and less important attributes in relation to attitude strength. More specifically, we examined if the *difference* between response times for important versus less important attributes was particularly high for respondents who hold a strong attitude. We computed a difference score by subtracting the mean RT to the selected (important) attributes from the mean RT to the non-selected (less important) attributes. Higher scores imply a stronger link between the important attributes and the attitude object as compared to the less important attributes. Correlating this score with the attitude strength measure we find a nearly significant correlation for smoking of .21 ($p < .06$). When doing the same for a stricter immigration policy in the Netherlands we find a significant correlation of .22 ($p < .05$).

We examined if this was primarily caused by the important attributes being faster in case of a strong attitude or perhaps even by slower less important attributes. For both attitude objects we found a relation between the strength of the attitude and the accessibility of the important attributes, with decreased response times for stronger attitudes ($r = .27$, $p < .02$, for smoking, $r = .19$, $p < .10$). For less important attributes we find no such pattern. This confirms our expectation that an associative network of important attributes particularly applies to objects people have strong feelings about.

General discussion

In Study 1 we replicated the findings of Van Harreveld et al. (2000) and showed that respondents are faster in judging attributes they consider important than attributes that they consider less important. Apparently even after making all attributes more accessible, the increased *chronic* accessibility of the *individually important* attributes was still apparent in the response time patterns. This relates to work on the *additive* nature of temporary and chronic accessibility (Bargh, Bond, Lombardi, & Tota, 1986).

² In five previous studies we included both our current measure and a dichotomous measure following Fazio's recommendations. Correlations between these measures were stable around .50 (.52, .47, .41, .44, and .57).

In the second study we argued that if people indeed derive their attitude from a number of important attributes associated with the attitude object, then ‘priming’ participants with these attributes should facilitate the overall attitudinal response. Conversely, priming participants with attributes that are not particularly important to their attitude should have no effect on the time needed to come to an overall attitudinal response. This is supported by the findings of Study 2.

In Study 3 we took these findings further by including a task that required less elaborate judgments, and we again found confirmation for the assumed chronic accessibility of a limited set of important attributes. This shows that these effects are not limited to experimental situations where we as experimenters put participants in a situation where they might think they have to elaborate and think more than they usually do. More importantly, we found evidence for a mediating role of attitude strength in this respect. The difference in association between attitude object and *important* attributes on the one hand and attitude object and *less important* attributes on the other hand is especially apparent when the attitude object is associated with strong feelings. Apparently especially when an issue is considered important, people are inclined to think in terms of attributes or possible consequences in relation to the attitude object. This supports our suggestion made elsewhere, where we argue that people might be more likely to engage in a bottom-up process of integrating attributes into an overall attitudinal judgment when the issue is sufficiently important (Van der Pligt et al., 2000). In case of a weaker attitude there is less evidence for a stable underlying structure of beliefs. In that case a direct retrieval of an overall attitudinal judgment will be more likely.

We would like to relate this line of research and our view on the process of attitudinal judgment to the currently dominant theoretical views on attitudes. While the SEU-based models of attitudes remain popular in applied settings where the primary aim is to predict behavior, basic research on attitudinal judgment is dominated by the work on *automatic* evaluative processes as described by Fazio (Fazio, 1993, 1995; Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986) and Bargh (e.g., Bargh et al., 1992; Bargh, Chaiken, Raymond, & Hymes, 1996; Chaiken & Bargh, 1993). Although Fazio and Bargh disagree about the generality of the automaticity of evaluations, they both assume that people do not need to recompute an overall judgment when they are confronted with the attitude object. They expect people to have an evaluative judgment stored in memory, ready to be retrieved. Our findings complement this influential line of research. While we would not want to argue that people always go through a process of integrating attributes, it does seem to be the case that, particularly in case of a strong attitude, there is a small network of important attributes associated with the at-

titude object ready to be retrieved. This of course is not in line with the reasoning by authors such as Tourangeau (1984, 1987) and Wilson (Wilson & Hodges, 1992) who argue that although there might occur a process of integrating attributes, often the *context* is what primarily drives which attributes are integrated. We believe that the context might play a more important role when it comes to less important attitudinal issues, while in case of more important issues a stable underlying set of attributes is what drives the overall judgment.

Since the influential work of Nisbett and Wilson (1977) the emphasis in research on attitudes and decision making has been on the flaws and biases of human cognition. We have shown that this emphasis does not do full justice to our cognitive abilities. For one thing, the present results show that, especially for strong attitudes, people *do* have insight into what are the important elements of their attitude.

Appendix A. Attributes of smoking

Smoking cigarettes:

1. Reduces fitness
2. Gives you a good feeling
3. Increases coughing
4. Helps to relax
5. Is expensive
6. Causes discomfort to others
7. Is bad for one's health
8. Is smelly
9. Prevents getting too heavy
10. Is addictive
11. Prevents getting bored
12. Increases the likelihood of lung cancer and heart diseases
13. Increases the ability to concentrate
14. Fosters social interaction
15. Helps to conceal one's uneasiness

Appendix B. Attributes of a stricter immigration policy

Maximizing the number of immigrants:

1. Is not in accordance with basic human rights
2. Does not distinguish between the needy and the less needy
3. Leads to less foreigners in this country
4. Leads to more living space in our country
5. Leads to less cultural diversity in our country
6. Leads to more employment for the Dutch
7. Leads to more illegal immigrants in this country
8. Shifts the problem to neighboring countries
9. Discourages economic refugees to come to this country
10. Is not in accordance with the idea that everyone should be able to live where he or she wants

11. Leads to more casualties in the country of origin
12. Leads to better accommodations for those who are admitted
13. Leads to a reduction of the problem of integration
14. Leads to a reduction of crime in this country
15. Saves the government a lot of money

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